Scholarly open access journals, Peer-reviewed, and Refereed Journals, Impact factor 8.14 (Calculate by google scholar and Semantic Scholar | AI-Powered Research Tool) , Multidisciplinary, Monthly, Indexing in all major database & Metadata, Citation Generator, Digital Object Identifier(DOI)
The concept of federalism in India represents a unique constitutional innovation tailored to the needs of a diverse, multilingual, and culturally pluralistic society. Unlike classical federations where sovereignty is equally shared between the Centre and States, the Indian Constitution adopts a quasi-federal model—one that combines the features of both unitary and federal systems. This dissertation critically examines Indian federalism from both a constitutional and judicial perspective, analysing how the division of powers and institutional mechanisms have functioned in practice, and how the judiciary has interpreted and evolved the contours of Centre-State relations.
The study begins by exploring the constitutional framework that governs Indian federalism, particularly the division of legislative, administrative, and financial powers under the Seventh Schedule, and the role of institutions like the Finance Commission, Inter-State Council, and the GST Council. It then evaluates how judicial decisions have reinforced or recalibrated this balance, especially through landmark judgments such as Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, and Mohit Minerals v. Union of India. These rulings have clarified the federal structure, limited the misuse of Article 356, and upheld the autonomy of States in fiscal matters.
The dissertation investigates contemporary issues such as the implementation of GST, the rise of cooperative and competitive federalism, and the implications of political centralisation on State autonomy. By adopting a doctrinal and analytical approach, this study highlights the tensions, contradictions, and cooperative mechanisms within the Indian federal system.
Ultimately, the dissertation concludes that while the constitutional foundation of Indian federalism remains robust, its effective functioning depends on judicial vigilance, institutional dialogue, and, most importantly, a political culture that respects decentralisation and pluralism. Indian federalism, though imperfect, continues to evolve as a vital mechanism for democratic governance and national unity.
Keywords:
Federalism, Indian Constitution, Centre-State Relations, Quasi-Federalism, Judicial Interpretation, Supreme Court of India, Constitutional Law
Cite Article:
"Federalism in India: A constitutional and judicial perspective on centre-state relations", International Journal of Science & Engineering Development Research (www.ijrti.org), ISSN:2455-2631, Vol.10, Issue 4, page no.c213-c225, April-2025, Available :http://www.ijrti.org/papers/IJRTI2504249.pdf
Downloads:
000355
ISSN:
2456-3315 | IMPACT FACTOR: 8.14 Calculated By Google Scholar| ESTD YEAR: 2016
An International Scholarly Open Access Journal, Peer-Reviewed, Refereed Journal Impact Factor 8.14 Calculate by Google Scholar and Semantic Scholar | AI-Powered Research Tool, Multidisciplinary, Monthly, Multilanguage Journal Indexing in All Major Database & Metadata, Citation Generator